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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
February 24, 1993, ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR REVIEW
alleging

entitlement

to

permanent,

total

disability

sustained as a result of an industrial accident.

benefits

A PETITION FOR

REVIEW of that ORDER was timely filed with this Court on March 18,
1993.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this PETITION FOR REVIEW
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE (S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There are three substantial issues presented for review:
(1)

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in determining

that Kleinsmith had to prove that his industrial injury was the
"significant" cause of his permanent, total disability.
(2)

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in determining

that Kleinsmith was not permanently, totally disabled due to his
industrial injury, and,
(3)

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in making a

finding that Kleinsmith was disabled due to a non-industrial cause
without sending this medical causation issue to a Medical Panel.
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to

I

the agency 7 s view of the law is required.
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated,
(1988).
1991).

Utah Administrative

Section

63-46b-16(4)

(d)

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah

State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner.

State

Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah

1977) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1988) and 35-1-77(1) (a)
(1988) are the determinative statutes in this case.
of

the

Industrial

applicable.

Commission's

Administrative

Rule 568-1-9

Rules

is

also

They are set forth in full in the Addendum hereto as

EXHIBIT A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Kleinsmith seeks review of the Industrial Commission ORDER
denying his MOTION FOR REVIEW wherein he alleged entitlement to
permanent,

total

disability

compensation

industrial accident.
2

occasioned

by

his

Course of Proceedings
Mr. Kleinsmith filed an Application for Hearing claiming
permanent, total disability compensation benefits sustained as the
result of an industrial injury that occurred on October 31, 1990.
(R. at 1) .

Respondents alleged that Mr. Kleinsmith did not

sustain a compensable industrial injury and is thus not entitled to
permanent, total disability benefits.

(R. at 12). A hearing was

held on April 9, 1992. (R. at 26).
Disposition Below
On November 25, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge held that
Plaintiff had failed to prove legal and medical causation that his
October 31, 1990, industrial accident was a significant cause of
his permanent, total disability. A Medical Panel was not appointed
to examine Mr. Kleinsmith or review his medical records. His claim
for

permanent,

total

disability

benefits was dismissed

prejudice for failure to establish medical causation.

with

(R. at 102-

111, copy attached to Addendum as EXHIBIT B).
He filed a MOTION FOR REVIEW with the Industrial Commission on
December 23, 1992, which was denied on February 24, 1993. (R. at
145-151,

copy

attached

to Addendum

as EXHIBIT

C).

He now

challenges that final agency action in this PETITION FOR REVIEW
before the Utah Court of Appeals.
Statement of the Facts
Danny Kleinsmith (also referred to herein as "Petitioner") was
employed by Allied Van Lines as a truck driver on October 31, 1990,
when the accident giving rise to this claim occurred.

2

(R. at 1).

On that date, while engaged in the regular course and scope of his
employment, Mr, Kleinsmith was exiting the cab of his semi truck
while at a stop in Logan, Utah.

He lost his grip on the support

bar next to the door of the cab and fell backwards about four feet
down, onto pavement, landing on his head, neck and upper back
areas.

Mr. Kleinsmith experienced neck, shoulder and right upper

extremity pain and problems in the following days.

(R. at 104-

109) .
Mr.

Kleinsmith

sought treatment

from

orthopedic

Dr. Glen Church for his neck/shoulder/back problems.

surgeon

(R. at 332-

343) . After more than half a year of treatment by Dr. Church, with
no significant relief, it was concluded that neck surgery was
warranted. (R. at 343). Thus, Dr. Church performed a discectomy
and fusion of C4-5 and C5-6 on April 15, 1991.

(R. at 265).

Almost one month later (May 11, 1991), just after receiving word
from his occupational health insurance carrier that the surgery
would not be covered, Mr. Kleinsmith had an apparent heart attack.
(R. at 340).

He checked into Logan Regional Hospital where

observation and testing, but no surgery or evasive procedures, were
performed.
The

(R. at 227-250).

Petitioner

also had

a

five vessel

coronary

bypass

operation on June 12, 1984, from which he recovered nicely. He did
not return to work for a few months after this surgery but then
worked continually, strong as ever, until his industrial accident
of October 31, 1990.

(R. at 276-329).

Since the Petitioner began seeing Dr. Church (December 26,
4

1990) , Dr. Church has had Mr. Kleinsmith off work due to his upper
back problems.

(R. at 342). Unfortunately, Dr. Church died on

April 1, 1992, making it impossible to seek clarification on a
chart note made September 26, 1991 reflecting that, "Therefore,
because of his age and his myocardial infarction, in my opinion he
should have a total permanent disability rating."

(R. at 343)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
The Petitioner undeniably suffered an industrial injury on
October 31, 1990.

None of the parties disputes the validity of

that accident and the attendant legal and medical causation.

Nor

does anyone dispute that Petitioner is presently permanently and
totally disabled.

The sole issue is whether his permanent, total

disability status is medically caused by his industrial accident.
While one phrase in a repeated chart note seems to undercut such a
finding in his favor, that is true only if it is read in isolation
and without reference to the totality of the record.

The chart

notes of Dr. Glen Church with respect to Petitioner's "age and his
myocardial infarction" are particularly suspect due to Dr. Church's
untimely death and resulting inability to explain the ambiguities
contained therein.
This case presents "significant medical issues" which mandate
the

utilization

of

a

Medical

Panel

under

the

Industrial

Commission's own Rules and Regulations. Such a referral would have
allowed an evaluation by expert medical doctors who would have the
Petitioner's entire medical records, not just several misleading
5

chart notes.

The findings of the Social Security Administration

are particularly suspect on this ground because they did not have
Petitioner's medical records regarding his spine.
This

Court

Commission's

should

determination

summarily

reverse

that Petitioner

the

did

Industrial

not

establish

medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well
established in this State as the fact that workers7 compensation
disability claims are to be liberally construed

in favor of

awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to
be resolved in favor of the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently

reiterated this principle from 1919 to the present.

Heaton v.

Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State v. Industrial
Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission,
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d
1362 (Utah 1980) ; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v.
Industrial

Commission,

405 P. 2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew

v.

Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v.
6

Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. supra. discussed the
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other. should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her FINDINGS OF FACT
7

AND

CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW failed to apply this vital rule of

construction. Nowhere in her findings or conclusions is there any
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appeared in
the record, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission construed it against the Petitioner which is contrary to
the

correct

statutory

compensation case.

construction

required

in

a

workers'

This is particularly true in regards to the

blind deference to an incomplete Social Security file which did not
contain Petitioner's most relevant medical records.
In light of the Industrial Commission's failure to properly
apply the Utah Workers' Compensation statutes, the finding of a
lack of medical causation, for the reasons set forth below, is
simply not supported by the record. The entire underlying basis of
the ORDER is thus flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not
evidence "humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The
ORDER should be reversed due to this conceptional flaw.

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT PERMANENTLY, TOTALLY DISABLED AS A
RESULT OF HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Kleinsmith was
awarded Social Security Disability based solely upon his coronary
condition

and

that

his

neck/back

problems

were

not

the

"significant" cause of keeping Mr. Kleinsmith out of the work
force.

(R. at 110).

The medical and testimonial evidence,
8

however, clearly indicate that the Petitioner was made permanently,
totally disabled due to his October 31, 1990, industrial accident.
The Administrative Law Judge places great weight on the fact
that Petitioner was awarded Social Security Disability benefits
solely on the basis of his coronary condition.
distortion

of the record

to

imply that the

It is, however, a
Social

Security

Administration ruled out his neck/back/shoulder problems as having
any contribution to his admittedly permanent, total disability
status. The plain fact is that the Social Security Administration
did

not have

all of Petitioner's medical records

and

never

attempted to sort out the relative contributions of his many
physical ailments.
due

to

his

He met a Social Security Disability "listing"

coronary

condition,

so

the

Social

Security

Administration did not have to look any further into his disability
claim.

The Industrial Commission, however, should look carefully

at all of a Petitioner's medical records and determine the true
cause of his or her disability.
The very letter from the Social Security Administration which
the Administrative Law Judge relied upon (R. at 126, copy attached
hereto in Addendum as EXHIBIT D) makes clear that the only records
considered

by

Cardiologist.

Social
Nancy

Security where those of Dr. Redd, his
J.

Hughes,

SSI

Operations

Supervisor,

specifically stated that: "The records of Dr. Church, the doctor
for his neck/back/upper extremities were not considered so it may
well be that he could have qualified for SSI benefits upon those
problems as well." (R. at 126 and EXHIBIT D).

1

To say that Mr. Kleinsmith was awarded

Social Security

Disability based solely upon his coronary condition and blindly
hold that this condition is what keeps him from returning to work
with no further inquiry or findings of fact is at best an oversight
and at worst, an aberration of judicial due process, particularly
in light of Ms. Hughes' statement.

Obviously his Social Security

Disability could not have been based on his neck/back/shoulder
problems if such records were not even requested and considered by
the Social Security Administration.
The cursory review of Mr. Kleinsmith7s case at the Social
Security Administration resulted in him being awarded benefits for
one reason

(coronary) when he could have just as easily been

awarded those benefits for another reason (neck/back/shoulder) , had
those records even been considered. This indiscriminate processing
of his Social Security claim by a claims examiner should not
prejudice him from receiving workers7 compensation benefits based
upon the real reason he cannot work.
Finally, it should be noted that Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-67(1) does not require a wholesale adoption of permanent,
total

disability

Administration.

factual

findings

by

the

Social

Security

Rather, it requires that the Commission adopt

rules which follow the "substance" of the federal sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration.
There is intended, and due process requires, that there be some
fact finding on the part of the Commission to determine what is
causing the Petitioner's permanent, total disability status.
10

The Industrial Commission's ruling in this case creates the
precedent and informal rule that the Commission is to be bound by
the findings of the Social Security Administration in every future
permanent, total disability claim with no latitude in determining
the true cause of disability.

This is not what Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1) mandates.
Medical causation in this case was provided by Petitioner's
neurosurgeon Dr. Otmar W. Albrand.

Dr. Albrand concretely and

unambiguously established both legal and medical causation in his
December 10, 1992, report where he remarks as follows:

"It is my

opinion that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering from injuries sustained
10-31-90 in an industrial accident and due to these injuries he's
unable to return to substantial work or gainful employment." (R. at
127) .
Moreover, Dr. Church, the Petitioner's former neurologist, had
mentioned that the Petitioner was permanently, totally disabled
"because of his age and his myocardial infarction."

(R. at 343).

However, as Mr. Kleinsmith testified at the hearing, it was his
understanding that Dr. Church had him off work solely for his
neck/back/shoulder problems (R. at 419-421) and that due to this
compounded

with

his

age

and

coronary

condition

(his back),

condition,

he is permanently, totally disabled. This is evidenced

by Dr. Church's July 8, 1991, letter wherein he lists both the
coronary condition as well as the neck as being permanently, total
disabling.

(R. at 6) . Stating that Petitioner is disabled due to

his neck (compounded by his age and coronary condition) would also
11

make

sense

given

that

Dr. Church

is a neurologist,

Mr. Kleinsmith for his back condition.

treating

Dr. Albrand confirms this

by stating, "He (Dr. Church) was his treating physician and I'm
sure

his

opinion

was

related

to

his knowledge

Kleinsmith while he was his treating physician."

of

Mr.

Danny

(emphasis added,

R. at 127) . That is, Dr. Church's opinion of total disability was
related to his knowledge of Mr. Kleinsmith and the neck surgery Dr.
Church had performed and treated him for.

Dr. Church took the

Applicant off work due to his neck and continued to have him off
work

for his neck alone

(R. at 342) through the date of his

(Dr. Church's) death. As a neurologist who treats the spine, he is
not

qualified

to

pass

judgment

on

Mr. Kleinsmith's

coronary

condition and, knowing that Mr. Kleinsmith was in the able hands of
cardiologist Dr. Redd, would leave such determinations regarding
that condition with Dr. Redd.
The Administrative Law Judge asserts that "there are medical
records of incapacitating heart problems."
entirely inaccurate.

(R. at 110). This is

The only evidence of incapacitating heart

problems are those from his June 12, 1984. five vessel coronary
bypass operation when he was off work for the few months following.
He was able to return to full-time, full duty work by the Fall of
1984.

(R. at 431 - 435).

After the second heart attack of May 11, 1991, he simply had
treadmill and other various testing, no surgery of any kind, and
was released.

No doctor, Dr. Redd included, instructed him to

refrain from work due to his coronary condition following his
12

second heart attack.

Even a lay person can appreciate the illogic

of asserting that after a major five vessel coronary bypass surgery
a man can return to work as strong as an ox but after a far less
severe heart attack requiring no treatment or surgery, the same man
is incapacitated.

He was already incapacitated from his neck/back

problems and instructed to be off work for the previous half a year
at the time of the second heart attack on May 11, 1991.
The coronary condition did not take him out of the work force,
nor is it keeping him out. He was working strong with his coronary
condition from 1984 through the date of his industrial accident to
his spine on October 31, 1990.
The Petitioner is dumbfounded by the ALJ's finding that, "His
cervical problems were only temporarily incapacitating following
surgery, and even then, they were not wholly the result of the
industrial

incident."

(R. at 110).

The Applicant was never

released by Dr. Church, nor anyone else, with respect to his spinal
problems and his current doctor. Dr. Albrand, is also of the
opinion that he has been and remains to this day unable to return
to substantial, gainful employment due to his back/neck problems.
Three years and continuing indefinitely is hardly "temporarily
incapacitating."

The fact that his problems may not wholly be the

result of the industrial incident is irrelevant for purposes of
determining permanent, total disability.
The relevant inquiry, in its simplest terms is, "What took Mr.
Kleinsmith out of the work force and is keeping him out?" Any preexisting component simply relates to the potential contribution
13

from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

He worked continually

through the date of the accident and, as Dr. Albrand states, is
suffering from spinal injuries on October 31, 1990, and is unable
to work due to those injuries.

Clearly, it is the October 31,

1990, industrial injury which took him out of the work force and is
preventing him from returning to work.
The only other possible implication pre-existing has in this
case would be to claim that the Petitioner must meet the higher
standard of causation set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

However, Mr. Kleinsmith's fall from four

feet onto his back onto concrete clearly satisfies this unexpected,
unintended extraordinary exertion contemplated by Allen.
Additionally, any alleged pre-existing problems all point to
his July 30, 1989, industrial accident which happened in the course
and scope of his employment with Allied.

Thus, since the alleged

pre-existing occurred with the same employer, the higher standard
of causation set forth in Allen would not apply anyway.

See. Fred

Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990).
If he is to be off work due to his coronary condition, then
why hasn't his long-standing cardiologist taken him off work?
Because, as Dr. Redd states, "the patients original disability was
the result of an injury he sustained while working."

(R. at 128).

He continues by stating that Mr. Kleinsmith should also seek the
opinion of a neurologist regarding permanent, total disability and
that if confirmed, his workers' compensation claim "should be
honored as this would be the primary reason for his having left
14

work and also the reason why he cannot return to work."
128).

(R. at

Dr. Otmar W. Albrand's letter of December 10, 1992 does

exactly that - his is a neurologist treating Mr. Kleinsmith's back
who states that the primary reason why he cannot work is his back
and thus, his workers' compensation claim should be honored. (R. at
127) .
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "The record contains
no clear physician's opinion which states that Kleinsmith is
permanently and totally disabled due to his cervical problem, nor
even

that

his

cervical

industrial accident."

problems were

(R. at 110).

solely

caused

by his

In light of Dr. Albrand's

December 10, 1992, letter (R. at 127), this is an incredulous
assertion.

Dr. Albrand unequivocally states that Mr. Kleinsmith

is permanently, totally disabled and that it is because of the
cervical problems from his 10-31-90 industrial injury. (R. at 127) .
The Utah Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to
the Industrial Commission

for a finding of permanent, total

disability as a result of the Applicant's October 31, 1990,
industrial accident.
Ill
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUE,
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as
follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the
15

medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed
by the commission•
Utah

Industrial

Commission

Rule

R568-1-9

governing

the

"Necessity of submitting a case to a Medical Panel" provides in
relevant part as follows:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, EXHIBIT A.
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved".

The rule

does not give the Administrative Law Judge unbridled discretion to
determine the existence of such issues, but rather definitively
states that, "Significant medical issues are involved where there
are:

(a)

conflicting

medical

reports

of

permanent

physical

impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person...."
It

cannot

be

disputed

that

this

case

clearly

contains

conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary by more than 5% of the whole person.
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The Administrative Law

Judge and the Industrial Commission have essentially taken the
position that there is no industrially related impairment from the
cervical injuries.
100%.

Thus, the disparity in the ratings is over

In such a case the need for Medical Panel referral is

mandatory.
The failure to refer to a Medical Panel in this cases is more
than an abuse of discretion - it is plain error.

See Lipman v.

Industrial Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission.
617 P. 2d

693

(Utah 1980) interpreting

the former Utah Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to medical
panels mandatory in cases of denied liability.
Although

reference

to

a Medical

Panel

under

Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commission's
own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9) . The failure
to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such referral is
mandatory is plain error.

"In some cases, such as where the

evidence of causal connection between the work-related event and
the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the
case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion."

Champion

Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah
1985).

See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986).

In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability is clear to
the Applicant and confirmed by the medical records but the ALJ
interpreted the medical records otherwise.
17

Thus, the issue of

medical causation then became uncertain, and failure to refer the
matter to a Medical Panel was error.

The Commission's ORDER

DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW should at a minimum be reversed and the
matter remanded with directions to refer the matter to a medical
panel since failure to do so was in direct conflict with Industrial
Commission practice and rule.

The failure to obtain a Medical

Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking
essential and necessary

information to adjudicate

Petitioner's

claim.

The ALJ instead took the place of a medical panel and

despite

substantial

evidence to the contrary,

ruled

that

claimant's disability was caused by his coronary condition.

the
This

is precisely the function of a medically trained panel.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
This case presents substantial evidence that

Petitioner's

permanent, total disability status is legally and medically the
result of his industrial injury.

Dr. Albrand's report on that

point is clear and unequivocal.

The Industrial Commission in

denying benefits to the Petitioner has ignored and failed to apply
the beneficent and entire purpose of the workers

compensation

system.
The failure to refer to a Medical Panel is a glaring error and
calls in and of itself for reversal and remand.

In a case such as

this, with the submission of incomplete medical records to Social
Security and the concrete confirmation of medical causation by Dr.
Albrand, the referral to a Medical Panel was not only appropriate
but required under the Industrial Commission's own Rules and Regulations.
18

Therefore,

it

is respectfully

requested

that

this

Court

reverse the final agency action, and remand with instructions to
either award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and
medical evidence presented which establish his permanent, total
disability claim, or in the alternative, to convene a Medical Panel
to facilitate the Administrative Law Judge in determining whether
the medical attention resulting from his industrial accident is
causing his current permanent, total disability.
DATED this (l th day of November, 1993.

Brian D. Kelm, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this

th day

of November, 1993 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies per her
stipulation)

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(1 copy per his
stipulation)

Anne Swensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 841415-5000

(2 copies per her
stipulation)

Danny Kleinsmith
2 72 West 3 00 South
Wellsville, Utah 84339

(1 copy)

File

(1 copy)

BRIAN D. KELM, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988).
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9.

EXHIBIT B:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
(November 25, 1992).

EXHIBIT C:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW (February 24, 1993) .

EXHIBIT D:

Social Security Administration letter from Nancy J.
Hughes (May 26, 1992).
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35-1-67. Permanent
total
disability
—
Amount
of
payments
Rehabilitation.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission
shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the
sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R.
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week,
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage,
rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69.
The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers1
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable
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permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section
35-1-69, Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings
have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation.
The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits.
The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands,
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah
1988 Second Special Session)
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35-1-77. Medical panel -- Medical director or medical consultants —
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing, of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56.
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R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers7 Reinsurance
Fund.
EXHIBIT A
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91001112
DANNY KLEINSMITH,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*

ALLIED VAN LINES, GULF
INSURANCE and/or EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on April
9, 1992, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Brian
Kelm, Attorney at Law.
i

The defendants, Allied Van Lines, Gulf Insurance,
were represented by Anne Swenson, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Employers Reinsurance Fund, was
represented by Erie Boorman, Administrator and
Attorney at Law.
This is a claim for permanent and total disability
connection with an alleged industrial accident of 10/31/90.

in

An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, additional time was given for the submission of documents.
Following that time, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
This is a claim for permanent and total disability
connection with an industrial accident allegedly occurring on

in
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October 31, 1990 and resulting in a neck injury. Kleinsmith was
employed as a long-distance truck driver during his entire adult
life, excluding his military service.
Defendants deny that
Kleinsmith is permanently and totally disabled, and add that, if he
is, his October 31, 1990 industrial accident did not cause his
disability.
Defendants claim that Kleinsmith's pre-existing heart
condition — with a history of two heart attacks — is the true
cause of his inability to continue gainful employment. Defendants
also claim that the applicant was an independent contractor of
Allied Van Lines, not an employee for the purposes of workers'
compensation coverage, and not in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of injury.
At the hearing, the facts of the relationship between Allied
and the applicant were developed through the unrebutted testimony
of Kleinsmith. Defendants presented no controverting evidence,
other than introducing the contract document which recited that
Kleinsmith was an independent contractor.
(Contractor Service
Operating Agreement between Circle Moving and Storage, Inc.
(Company) and Danny D. Kleinsmith (Contractor), May 18, 1990.)
The contract states several times that the relationship
between the contracting parties is that of "independent
contractor." It requires among other things that Contractor will
paint and maintain his equipment to Company's specifications, will
give Company exclusive use of such equipment, will obey Company
guidelines on driver qualification and service apparel, will comply
with Company procedures as to paperwork, will give Company written
notice before substituting equipment, and will generally be liable
to Company for losses incurred during shipment. Contractor is to
pay his own vehicle operating expenses and hire his own helpers,
and the Company may assess fines against him for Contractor's
violation of Company's procedures.
The applicant testified that Allied controlled every aspect of
his work life. He owned a truck tractor, but leased the truck
trailer from Allied. He stated that Allied required that both the
truck and tractor be painted and decaled with "Allied" insignia.
Kleinsmith testified that he was required to send a color picture
to Allied each year showing the appearance of the truck and driver
to satisfy Allied's standards.
Allied required Kleinsmith to haul loads procured- through
Allied's agent, Circle Moving and Storage. Kleinsmith testified
that, although he believed the contract allowed him to haul non-
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Allied loads, he never did so, because he believed negative
repercussions would result from Allied, He also testified that if
he were able to take a non-Allied load, he believed Allied and
their agent would receive percentages of his revenue from that
load.
The applicant testified that he called Allied dispatch at
least once per day, and sometimes more often. They informed as to
where to pick up loads and deliver them. They required him to wear
an Allied-provided uniform. They paid for his physicals and drug
tests. Kleinsmith acknowledged that he was allowed to hire his own
helpers to assist him in loading and unloading duties, but
testified that the helpers had to meet Allied's appearance and
grooming standards, and wear an Allied t-shirt. He added that,
while the contract provided that Allied did not select the routes
driven by Kleinsmith, he believed the routes were selected by
Allied in all practical effect because they would only pay him
mileage for the most direct route between two points.
Kleinsmith attended Allied Van Lines "van foreman school" to
learn the Allied methods of furniture moving. He hauled no other
items nor performed furniture moving for any other party but Allied
during the period of time in question. The applicant recited that
repairs and service on his truck were his responsibility, but at
one point, Allied did advance engine repair costs to JQeinsmith
which he later repaid.
As referred to in the contract, Allied retained the right to
make certain deductions from the monies paid to Kleinsmith for his
services. These deductions included a premiums for Allied-required
insurance coverage which was actually insurance "through the
Company", Provision 16 and 17, Contract.
This included
occupational hazard insurance through NAIT.
The applicant testified that Allied purchased all the required
ICC and other permits needed for him to transport goods in certain
states, and that he possessed no separate authority to do so.
Kleinsmith7s claim for permanent and total disability alleges
that he suffered an injury on October 31, 1990. On that date,
Kleinsmith was driving his truck on return trip from Denver,
Colorado, where he had unloaded a load. In Denver, he had spoke
with Allied's dispatcher by phone and been told to make some
repairs on his truck. Kleinsmith knew a repair shop in Logan,
where he lived, and elected to make the repairs there. He arrived
in Logan, Utah and stopped at a store for milk and cookies. He
estimated the time of the stop was 7:30 p.m..
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The applicant further testified that as he was getting out of
his truck at the store, he let go of the support too soon, and fell
backwards four feet onto the pavement. He stated that he hurt his
head, upper back and neck. He got up and continued about his
business, completing his drive to his home.
The next day he
delivered the truck to the shop for repairs.
The parties disputed whether or not Kleinsmith was in the
course and scope of his employment at the time of the fall.
Applicant contends that he was still "under dispatch" at the time
of his stop and that he was in the process of obtaining truck
repairs which were required by Allied. Defendants argue that he
was not performing any duties for Allied at the time he stopped for
milk and cookies, but was merely on a personal errand. They also
point to the Driver Duty Logs completed by Kleinsmith which show
him off duty as soon as he arrived in Logan, Utah at 6 p.m.
As the applicant stayed off work the next couple of days, he
noticed that his right hand and arm with stiff and sore. On
November 2, 1990, he visited the Logan Regional Hospital Emergency
Room. Their records show that he was reporting neck and shoulder
pain (ex. D-l, p. 29). The records also include results of a CT
scan which note degenerative changes in the spine, "long-standing
spondylolysis with first degree spondylolisthesis" and "moderately
advanced arthritic changes of the right shoulder," (Ex. D-l, p.
30.) The records of Dr. Paul Barney, who treated the applicant,
attributed his condition to the industrial injury on the
Physicians First Report of Injury, (Ex. D-l, p. 128) and
recommended further tests.
The applicant had injured himself previously on July 30, 1989,
while delivering a load for Allied in New Jersey.
On that
occasion, he fell off a six-foot ladder with an 80-lb. carton in
his arms. The carton fell on him, he hurt his back, neck and heel
bone, and was off work six weeks. No medical records were provided
for treatment of this injury, although the exhibit did contain
records of chiropractic treatment that Kleinsmith received from
Dennis Paquin in May, 1990.
For treatment of the October, 1990 injury, Kleinsmith was
referred to Dr. Glen Church. The doctor saw him on 12/26/90 and
noted "degenerative disc disease at C4-5"..."advanced osteophytic
proliferation
and
some
disc
herniation
at
C4-5,"
and
spondylolisthesis at L4-5. He recommended a myelogram and thought
that surgery was likely. He did not make a specific statement as
to medical causation. (Ex. D-l, p. 137.)
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Dr. Church reviewed the myelogram in March, 1991 and concluded
that the applicant had a herniated disc with osteophytic formation
as well at C4-5 and he recommended surgery. (Ex. D-l, p. 138.)
That surgery was performed on April 21, 1992, by Dr. Church at
McKay Dee Hospital.
The operative report states, ". . . The
patient had degenerative disc disease plus disc herniation." (ex.
D-l, p. 53.)
The applicant testified that he was anxious after the neck
surgery because he did not understand whether or not he had
insurance coverage. At that point, he had been off work several
months and was submitting claims for benefits to NAIT, his
insurance carrier. On May 11, 1991, Kleinsmith had a second heart
attack. He was hospitalized at Logan Regional Hospital and then
transferred to the Veterans Administration Medical Center on May
13, 1991. (ex. D-l, p. 82, et sea.)
The medical opinion of Dr. Glen Church stated that the
applicant's coronary artery disease was unrelated to his work or
other injuries (July 8, 1991, Ex. D-l, p. 139.)
The medical
records of Dr. Edward Redd state that Kleinsmith had pre-existing
coronary artery disease and that he ". . .probably had gradual
progression of his coronary artery disease and likely had some
recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts placed 6
years ago. This is combination with moderately elevated blood
pressure likely resulted in his heart attack." (Ex. D-l, p. 151.)
Dr. Redd noted that Kleinsmith's blood pressure was not markedly
elevated at the hospital enough to produce a myocardial infarction
on its own. In a later opinion, he clarified that the stress could
have contributed ,,5%" to the heart attack, and that Kleinsmith's
overall impairment was 65% of the whole person
(Ex. D-l, p.
155.)
Following the applicant's recovery from his second heart
attack, he received follow-up care for his neck surgery from Dr.
Church. Dr. Church gave him a 20% permanent partial disability
rating without explanation as to the basis for this finding, and
observed that he had performed the surgery ". . . for severe
degenerative arthritis." (July 8, 1991, Ex. D-l, p. 139.) In a
subsequent visit, Dr. Church opined that the applicant was unable
to work due to his age and myocardial infarction. (Ex. D-l, p.
141, see also note of February 27, 1992.)
Dr. Church passed away in 1992, and the applicant continued
his care with Dr. Omar Albrand, whom he saw in May, 1992. Dr.
Albrand re-ordered diagnostic tests and found evidence of
degenerative conditions and herniation. He opined that Kleinsmith

DANNY KLEINSMITH
ORDER
PAGE SIX
was disabled from heavy labor work, but gave no statement as to
medical cause. (August 25, 1992 opinion.)
On May 18, 1992, Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed an Independent
Medical Evaluation. He concluded that the majority of Kleinsmith's
orthopedic problems were pre-existing and degenerative, and he
declined to ascribe any permanent partial impairment to the
10/31/90 industrial accident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Independent Contractor/Employee
The applicant, Danny Kleinsmith, has proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was an employee, not an independent
contractor, of the defendant, Allied. Van Lines and their agent,
Circle Moving and Storage, Inc.
Further, Kleinsmith's position as an employee is supported by
the tests found in relevant case law on independent contractor
status under workers' compensation law. The distinction between
independent contractor and employee for purposes of workers'
compensation coverage turns on several factors, including the
hiring party's right to control the individual, the method of
payment, furnishing of equipment, and right to fire.
The seminal case in Utah on this subject also dealt with a
truck driver - Harry L. Young and Sons. Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d
316 (Utah 1975.) In Young, the applicant, Ashton, was a truck
driver who leased H.L. Young's truck. Ashton had to clear loads
with Young's supervisor, check with Young's dispatcher regularly,
and was advised by Young as to mileage and speed limits. Young had
the right to penalize Ashton for violating company policies. The
court found that Ashton was an employee for workers' compensation
purposes.
In Young, the Court noted, "The determination of the status of
an employee is based on various factors and of primary concern is
the control, direction, supervision or the right to control, direct
or supervise on behalf of the employer."
The Court also stated
that none of the factors in a "right to control" test is separately
dispositive, but "[I]t is from consideration of all of them
together that the determination is to be made..." Id.
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In the case of Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726
P.2d 427 (Utah 1986), to which the parties cite, the Utah Supreme
Court emphasized that ". . . it will almost always follow that if
the evidence shows that an 'employer7 retains the right to control
the work of the claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee
for workmen's compensation purposes [citations omitted].
Certainly, the concept of right to control is not to be rigidly and
narrowly defined. Rather, it should be defined to give full effect
to the remedial proposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
[citations omitted.]11
The Court added that it was proper to
resolve doubt as to whether the worker was an employee in favor of
the employee.
Thus, the language of a contract is merely one factor to be
considered in determining a true independent contractor status.
The actual practice and intent of the parties may be more
instructive to the fact-finder than the bare contractual language
itself. In the present case, both the contract and the parties'
practice indicate a high level of control was exerted over
Kleinsmith by Allied.
The Administrative Law Judge specifically finds that the
applicant's day-to-day work was controlled by Allied, because they
controlled his constant contact with their dispatch, his appearance
and the appearance and condition of his equipment and helpers, his
conduct, his completion of their paperwork, his compliance with
their policies, his submission to their deductions for insurance
and fines, and his ability to procure non-Allied loads. Despite
the illusion of freedom that his contract recited, Kleinsmith was
very much bound to Allied's control of his workday.
Course and Scope of Employment
The next issue to address is the question of whether
Kleinsmith was in the course and scope of his employment with
Allied when he stopped to get milk and cookies when he arrived in
Logan on October 31, 1990. Although the driver's log states that
he went off duty at 6 p.m., Kleinsmith testified that he actually
arrived in Logan at 7:30 p.m. and stopped for milk and cookies as
soon as he arrived in town. The Administrative Law Judge adopts
the applicant's testimony as more accurate, having had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness firsthand.

DANNY KLEINSMITH
ORDER
PAGE EIGHT
The Administrative Law Judge further finds the applicant to be
in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the stop,
A break for food is commonly recognized as a personal comfort
errand which does not constitute a substantial deviation from the
work duties. Kleinsmith was on his way to obtain truck repairs.
A stop for food is an incidental and reasonably necessary activity
for a long-distance truck driver, and it was conducted in a
reasonable method with no intent to abandon his job-oriented
purpose. In fact, Kleinsmith went on to deliver the truck for
repairs as ordered.
Medical Causation
Having found that the applicant was an employee of the
defendants for workers' compensation purposes, we turn to the
question of his entitlement to permanent and total disability
benefits. Unfortunately, the Administrative Law Judge concludes
that the applicant has failed to prove medical causation.
First, it is clear that Kleinsmith's heart attack was a nonindustrial condition.
The medical records of Dr. Glen Church
diagnosed Kleinsmith with coronary artery disease unrelated to his
work or other injuries as of July 8, 1991 (Ex. D-l, p. 139). The
medical records of Dr. Edward Redd clearly state that Kleinsmith
had pre-existing coronary artery disease and that he ". . .probably
had gradual progression of his coronary artery disease and likely
had some recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts
placed 6 years ago. This is combination with moderately elevated
blood pressure likely resulted in his heart attack." (Ex. D-l, p.
151)
Dr. Redd noted that Kleinsmith's blood pressure was not
markedly elevated at the hospital enough to produce a myocardial
infarction on its own. In a later opinion, he clarified that the
stress could have contributed "5%" to the heart attack, and that
Kleinsmith/s overall impairment was 65% whole person (Ex. D-l, p.
155.)
Second, the records show that the applicant was awarded Social
Security Disability solely on the basis of his [non-industrial]
heart condition. (Letter from Nancy J. Hughes, May 26, 1992.) Dr.
Church found him unable to work due to his age and his myocardial
infarction, (Ex. D-l, p. 141.) No doctor has attributed his heart
condition to an industrial cause. In fact, the applicant's doctors
specifically refuse to attribute causation of his heart attack to
his October 31, 1990, neck injury.

001 .';9

DANNY KLEINSMITH
ORDER
PAGE NINE

Third, Kleinsmith's cervical problems were, at best, due to a
combination of industrial as well as pre-existing causes. The
medical record contain extensive references to the pre-existing
degenerative cervical conditions by every physician who examined
Kleinsmith.
The question before the Commission is whether or not the
industrial injury occurring on October 31, 1991, was a significant
cause of Applicant's permanent and total disability status. The
inquiry into causation of Applicant's disability is governed by
case law set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986) and its progeny. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the
industrial accident need not be the "proximate cause" of the
disability, but it must be a "dominant" or "significant" cause.
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).
In the case herein, there are medical records of
incapacitating heart problems which are unrelated to Kleinsmith's
industrial accident. His cervical problems were only temporarily
incapacitating following surgery, and even then, they were not
wholly the result of the industrial incident.
The record contains no clear physician's opinion which states
that Kleinsmith is permanently and totally disabled due to his
cervical problems, nor even that his cervical problems were solely
caused by his industrial accident. Dr. Albrand's opinion assists
the Applicant somewhat with the first part of the equation, but
fails to establish the industrial causation aspect. And, with the
record in that posture, the Applicant has failed to prove medical
causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
After reviewing the above findings of fact, the Administrative
Law Judge finds insufficient evidence of both legal and medical
causation to rule that the October 31, 1990, industrial accident
was a significant cause of Applicant's permanent and total
disability.
The present case is similar to Hodges v. Western Piling and
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), wherein an applicant was
denied permanent and total disability benefits on the grounds of
medical causation. In that case, medical evidence established that
the applicant would be "one hundred percent impaired as a result of
arthritis alone. . ."
Id. at 721.
The record in this case
indicates that Kleinsmith may have been disabled due to his preexisting coronary artery disease, and that condition had the most
practical and measurable impact on his ability to perform the
strenuous work of a long-distance truck driver.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the permanent and total
disability claim of the applicant, Danny Kleinsmith, should be and
the same is hereby denied for lack of medical causation, and is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge

Certified this,^^day of ~ > 7 ^
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case Number 91001112
Danny Kleinsmith,
Applicant,

*
*
*

vs.

*

ORDER
DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

|v

Allied Van Lines,Gulf Insurance *
Company and/or the Employers7
*
Reinsurance Fund,
*
*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
Danny Kleinsmith ("applicant") timely filed a motion for
review of the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order denying his
claim for permanent total disability benefits. The ALJ denied the
claim because the applicant failed to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that his industrial accident of October 31, 1990 was
the medical cause of his permanent and total disability. The
applicant asserts that the ALJ failed to liberally construe the
workers compensation act in favor of the applicant and erred in
concluding that the applicant was not permanently and totally
disabled as a result of his industrial accident of October 31,
1990.
1. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT?
The applicant quotes language from Chandler v. Industrial
Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919) , this case discussed the proper
construction and application of the Utah workers compensation act.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Chandler, noted that the statute was to
be "liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice" and "that in view of the purposes
of such acts, in case there i^ any doubt respecting the right to
compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the
employee or his dependents as the case may be." Id. at 1021-1022.
The applicant claims that the ALJ erred in her failure to
construe the workers compensation act liberally in favor of
awarding benefits to the applicant. He asserts that a long history
of Utah workers compensation case law supports his view that any
doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
claimant. The respondent notes that the Utah courts have required
liberal construction of the workers compensation statute and
resolution of doubts in favor of the applicant in situations where
the evidence on both sides is equally probative. However, there is
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no requirement that an applicant be awarded benefits when he has
failed to present evidence to show the requisite causal connection
between his disabling condition and his industrial accident.
The cases cited by the applicant in support of his motion for
review relate to the general principles behind the proper
construction of the workers compensation statute. The Utah Supreme
Court has noted that "the right to compensation arises out of the
relation existing between employer and employee, and that the
injury arises out of and in the course of employment." Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919). Nothing in
the analysis of the purposes of the workers compensation act
presented in Chandler supports the notion that an employee who
cannot establish a causal connection between his disability and his
employment is entitled to benefits.
In the present case, the applicant failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that his industrial accident and
injury caused his subsequent disability. The analysis of medical
causation will be set out infra.
2. DID THE ALJ ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT
WAS NOT TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED AS A RESULT
OF THE ACCIDENT OF OCTOBER 31, 1990?
The applicant asserts that the medical and testimonial
evidence in the record supports his contention that the industrial
accident of October 31, 1990, rendered him permanently and totally
disabled due to his back condition. The applicant asserts that his
social security disability benefits were awarded solely on the
basis of his coronary condition because the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") did not consider his back condition when
they made the award. The applicant asserts that the ALJ simply
adopted the SSA's findings which did not include any findings
related to his back condition, and then relied upon them to deny
his claim.
Review of the ALJ , s decision and the record show that this is
simply not the case.
The ALJ noted that the applicant's heart
condition was not industrially related and that he was awarded
social security disability solely on the basis of his nonindustrial heart condition. Order, p. 8. Review of the medical
records shows that the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Church1
did not solely attribute the applicant's back and neck problems to
his industrial injury of October 31, 1990. Exhibit D-l p.135-141.
Dr. Church noted that the applicant suffered an industrial
1

Who, unfortunately, is now deceased.
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accident in August 1989 when he fell backwards from a ladder while
carrying a 70 pound box. Dr. Church noted that the applicant fell
from his truck in October 1990 and began to have headaches. The
applicant has experienced pain and weakness in his right arm,
however, since the August 1989 accident. Id. at 135. X-rays
reviewed by Dr. Church in January 1991, showed degenerative disc
disease at C4-5.
A CT scan showed "advanced osteophytic
proliferation and some disc herniation at C4-5." Id. at 137. In
his letter of July 8, 1991, Dr. Church stated that the applicant
"underwent anterior cervical discectomy and fusion for severe
degenerative arthritis." Id. at 139 (emphasis added). Dr. Church
went on to opine that he did "not think the injuries caused his
heart attack." Id.
Dr. Church further opined that the applicant had a permanent
partial disability rating of 20 percent although it is unclear what
the rating is attributed to. The doctor felt that the applicant
should have a permanent disability rating based on his coronary
artery disease and his neck. Id. The doctor did not apportion the
disability between pre-existing, non-industrial and industrial
causes, but noted that he would consider the applicant to be
permanently disabled from his neck alone for six weeks from the
date of the July 6, 1991 letter. Id. at 140. In the last record
entered by Dr. Church, he stated that the applicant was totally
disabled from work as a furniture mover, but again, did not attempt
at that time, to apportion his disability among the several
possible causes. Id. at 141.
X-rays interpreted by Dr. Dennis Paquin, D.C. on or about
November 20, 1990 were noted to show "Degenerative joint disease C4
and C5; Osteophytic lesions anterior motor unit C7;
Disc
deterioration C4 and C5; Mild degenerative joint changes of C6 and
C7." Exhibit D-l, p.150. An X-ray series conducted on November 2,
1990 was interpreted as follows: "1. Cervical spine showing disc
disease with some foraminal encroachment of the C4-5 level. Milder
degenerative changes at C6-7 are also noted without definite
fractures.... 3. Moderately advanced arthritic changes of the right
shoulder." Exhibit D-l at 30. * A CT scan interpreted by Dr. Child
on November 13, 1990 showed "Advanced disc degenerative change is
present
resulting
in moderate posterior bony
osteophyte
formation..., ventral encroachment upon the spinal canal by the
osteophyte, this does not appear to encroach significantly upon the
spinal cord..."
and
"associated proliferative degenerative
changes of the uncovertebral joints and these result in moderate
narrowing of both nerve root canals."
Dr. Child also noted
degenerative changes at C5-6 with "moderate encroachment on the
left C5-C6 nerve root canal, "moderate disc degenerative change ...
without significant posterior osteophyte formation and without
significant narrowing of the nerve root canals" at C6-C7 and
"modest degenerative changes at C7-T1 with no evidence for
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encroachment upon neural structures."

Id. at 32.

A cervical myelogram performed at McKay-Dee Medical Center on
February 21, 1991, showed amputation of the nerve root sleeves at
C4-C5 bilaterally and at C7-T1 on the right side. The myelogram
also showed a ventral osteophytic formation at C4-C5 related to
degenerative disease. Jd. at 50. A CT scan on the same date
showed a bulging or herniated disc. Id. The applicant had an
anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion of C4-5 and C6-7 in April
1991. An X-ray on April 3, 1990 showed that the applicant had
"mild osteoarthritis of the right shoulder" as well as
"degenerative disc disease, degenerative facet disease and neural
foraminal narrowing of the cervical spine." Id. at 75-77.
Dr. Boyd Holbrook reviewed the applicant's medical records
upon the request of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. Dr. Holbrook
observed that "the pathology in the cervical spine was preexisting. The first accident in July or August 1989 precipitated
it to a symptomatic standpoint from which it never recovered."
Holbrook letter, May 18, 1992, p. 5.
The ... accident of 10-30-90 called attention to the neck
problem and radiculopathy. The only possible contributing
effect or possible aggravation by the fall that can be
identified is the statement of Dr. Barney when he first
saw him 11-20-90 is 'feels that he has lost strength
right arm.' It is not clear that this means that he lost
strength since this accident and Dr. Church noted that it
was there before....
Further degenerative changes that occur will not be the
result of this industrial accident but will be the result
of the nature of the progressive degenerative arthritis
that he has in his cervical spine. It is not reasonable
to assert a relationship of the industrial accident to
further progressive changes as these are inevitable
regardless of the industrial accident. We do know that
there appears to be an ^acceleration of degenerative
changes adjacent to fused levels. At the greatest risk
is the unfused disc at C-5-6 as it is a mobile space
between two fixed fused segments.
Id,
Under the heading "conclusions," Dr. Holbrook noted that:
The industrial accident did not specifically cause any
identifiable pathological process and thus it does not
appear that any of the permanent impairment should be
ascribed to the fall of 10-31-91 [sic] as the ultimate
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surgery was inevitable... If an ulnar neuropathy is
identified as suggested by Dr. Church 2-27-92 there is no
current information that would relate it to the accident
of 10-31-91 [sic] at this time. The history and physical
findings indicate that this patient was a candidate for
surgery at the time that this accident occurred and had
he sought consultation at that time surgery would have
been recommended... Further degenerative changes of the
cervical spine are inevitable and would have been
progressive in nature absent this industrial accident and
thus those further changes when they occur are not a
result of this industrial accident... Dr. Church reports
no neck pain or radicular pain and no muscle wasting or
any weakness that he can determine thus the portion of
his disability related to the cervical spine would be
only that contributed by limitation of motion. There
would be a significant calculated permanent impairment of
the cervical spine.
Id. at p. 6, (emphasis in original).
Dr. Otmar W. Albrand examined the applicant in May 1992.
Following his first examination of the applicant, the doctor
recommended a new cervical and lumbar myelogram. Letter, July 9,
1992. The reports showed that the applicant has:
degenerative disc disease and spondylosis at C3-C4 and
C5-C6, minimal evidence of diffuse bulge of minimal
subligamenous disc herniation.
At C6-C7 there is
evidence of posterior hypertropic vertebral body bone
spur, the old bone graft pressing on the anterior portion
of the spinal cord.... I feel the patient is disabled
with the problem in his neck and also in his low back . ..
All the findings on the myelogram CT are consistent with
a painful condition not suitable for heavy labor type
work.
Letter, August 25, 1992.
In response to a letter from the applicant's attorney, Dr.
Albrand wrote:
He still has complaints referable to his neck and low
back with limitation of motion as the main physical and
objective findings with muscle spasm in the neck and low
back. I might say that his complaints referable to his
neck and low back contribute to his disability at
present. It seems to me on reading his history that the
patient was out of the work force because of neck problem
[sic] and while recovering from the surgery had a
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myocardial
surgery.

infarction

and

required

coronary

bypass

Letter, September 10, 1992.
Dr. Albrand subsequently stated that "[i]t is also my opinion
that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering from injuries sustained 10-31-91
[sic] in an industrial accident and due to those injuries he's
unable to return to substantial work or gainful employment."
Letter, December 10, 1992. The applicant has also submitted a
letter from his cardiologist, Dr. Redd in which the doctor stated:
As I understand the facts, Mr. Kleinsmith had a neck and
shoulder injury on the job resulting in apparently
permanent disability of that extremity. This is based on
the patients [sic] report of a conversation with Dr.
Glenn Church who has expired.... It must be stated in no
uncertain terms, however, that the patients [sic]
original disability was the result of an injury he
sustained while working.
Letter, April 28, 1992.
A determination of permanent total disability is a question of
fact. Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985).
We will not disturb an ALJ , s findings of fact when there is
substantial evidence in the record to support those findings. We
believe that there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the ALJ's determination that the applicant is not permanently and
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident on October
31, 1990.
The Industrial Accident Division's rules on permanent total
disability require that the ALJ determine "if a significant cause
of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some
other unrelated cause or causes." U.A.C. R568-1-17(C) (1992); See
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ct.App. 1988) . After
reviewing the entire record, *we believe that the applicant has
failed to show a causal connection between his industrial accident
of 10-31-90 and his disability. It is clear from the record that
the applicant suffered from arthritic and degenerative conditions
in his cervical spine prior to the accident of October 31, 1990.
Dr. Albrand asserted that there is a causal connection between the
October 1990 accident and the applicant's disability, but failed to
discuss the extent of that disability in relation to the
applicant's pre-existing conditions.
All of the doctors who
examined the applicant discussed his disability from his neck and
coronary conditions, but none of them attempted to relate the
various disabilities to a specific industrial or non-industrial
cause.
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We cannot award the applicant permanent total disability
benefits in the absence of competent medical evidence which shows
that the applicant's industrial accident was a "significant" cause
of his disability.
We therefore affirm the ALJ's findings and
order.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law
judge dated November 25, 1992 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the
Utah Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86,
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep / t. of Employment Security et
al. , Case No. 920621-CA (Utah App. Dec. 4, 1992). The requesting
party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing
for appeals purposes.
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Salt Lake City, UT 34101
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Mr. Kleinsmith received his SSI award based upon the medical records
in his file which were those of Dr. Redd. The records of Dr. Church,
the doctor for his neck/back/upper extremities were not considered so
it may well be that he would have qualified for SSI based upon those
problems as well.
If there are any questions, please feel free to
contact our office.
Sincerely,

upervisor
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